Abstract. Congestion games are a fundamental class of noncooperative games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In the network version, each player wants to route one unit of flow on a path from her origin to her destination at minimum cost, and the cost of using an arc only depends on the total number of players using that arc. A natural extension is to allow for players sending different amounts of flow, which results in so-called weighted congestion games. While examples have been exhibited showing that pure-strategy Nash equilibria need not exist, we prove that it actually is strongly NP-hard to determine whether a given weighted network congestion game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This is true regardless of whether flow is unsplittable (has to be routed on a single path for each player) or not.
Introduction
Game theory in general and the concept of Nash equilibrium in particular have lately come under increased scrutiny by theoretical computer scientists. Computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is a case in point. Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2006) showed only recently that finding a mixed Nash equilibrium in a game of any constant number of players is reducible to solving a 4-player game. Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (2006) showed in turn that the latter problem is PPAD-complete. Subsequently, Chen and Deng (2005) and Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005) proved that computing mixed Nash equilibria in games with three players is PPAD-complete as well. Eventually, Chen and Deng (2006) established the same result for the two-player case.
While Nash (1951) showed that mixed Nash equilibria do exist in any finite noncooperative game, it is well known that pure-strategy Nash equilibria are in general not guaranteed to exist. It is therefore natural to ask which games have pure-strategy Nash equilibria and, if applicable, how difficult is it to find one. In this article, we study these questions for certain classes of weighted congestion and local-effect games.
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal (1973) , who showed that they are guaranteed to possess pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In a congestion game, a player's strategy consists of a subset of resources, and her disutility only depends on the number of players choosing the same resources. An important subclass of congestion games can be represented by means of networks. Each player wants to route one unit of flow from her origin to her destination, at minimal cost. The network arcs are the resources, and a player's set of pure strategies consists of the sets of arcs corresponding to paths connecting her origin-destination pair. Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar (2004) studied the computational complexity of finding pure-strategy Nash equilibria in congestion games. For symmetric network congestion games, where all players have the same origin-destination pair, they presented a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, they proved that this problem is PLS-complete for symmetric congestion games as well as for asymmetric network congestion games. A simpler proof of the latter result was given by Ackermann, Röglin, and Vöcking (2006a) , who also showed that this result still holds if the cost functions are affine-linear.
In (unweighted) network congestion games, each player routes exactly one unit of flow along a single path. In weighted congestion games, players can have different amounts of flow. Depending on whether players are allowed to split their flows or not, a player's strategy consists of a set of paths with corresponding integer flow values between her origin-destination pair, or of a single path.
Fotakis, Kontogiannis, and Spirakis (2005) studied weighted network congestion games with unsplittable flows. They constructed simple examples of symmetric instances that do not possess a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, they proved that for the special case of affine cost functions, a purestrategy Nash equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist. Awerbuch, Azar, and Epstein (2005) derived a tight bound of ( √ 5 + 3)/2 on the pure price of anarchy for this special case. They also considered the case when the cost functions are polynomials of fixed degree greater than 1. However, Goemans, Mirrokni, and Vetta (2005) showed that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium need not exist for instances with cost functions that are polynomials of degree at most 2. Milchtaich (1996) had earlier shown that weighted congestion games with player-specific disutility functions on networks consisting of parallel arcs only do not always have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
